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Force Majeure Implications of Acid
Rain Legislation: The Litigation Battle
of the 1990s
JOHN R. RHORER, JR.* AND PENNY R. WARREN**
INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s, utilities turned to the courts to avoid the
high coal prices they agreed to pay under long-term, "base price
plus escalator" contracts' entered into during the energy crisis
of the 1970s, or shortly thereafter. 2 When spot market coal prices
and energy demand fell in the early 1980s, but contract prices
continued to escalate, utilities carefully evaluated their contracts
to determine if there might be some excuse from performance
that a regulatory body, in hindsight, could use to deny a rate
increase.3 In the words of one court, a utility "apparently searched
the law books to unearth every conceivable cause of action."
4
* Partner, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Lexington, Kentucky. J.D., University of
Kentucky, 1981; B.A., Centre College, 1978.
* Senior Attorney, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Lexington, Kentucky. J.D., Uni-
versity of Kentucky, 1979; M.B.A. University of Arkansas, 1972; B.A., Murray State
University, 1968.
1 Base price plus escalator ("BPE") contracts typically set an initial "base" price
for various components of the cost of mining coal, such as labor, materials and supplies,
and profit. Over the term of the contract some or all of the component prices are
escalated according to changes in government indices or actual costs. Edmund M.
Carney, Pricing Provisions in Coal Contracts, 24 ROCKY MTN. MN. L. INST., 197, 219-
225 (1978). BPE contracts have always been popular but were strongly preferred by
utilities in the heightened regulatory environment of the 1970s and 1980s. Robert H.
Forry, Coal Supply Agreements from the Public Utility's Perspective, 7 E. MIN. L. INsT.
§ 7.1, § 7.05141 at 7-18 (1986); Carney, supra, at 204-207, 219. Based upon the authors'
experience, the trend at least since the late 1980s has been to add periodic market price
reopeners to BPE contracts and, in some cases, to provide for termination if no
agreement is reached on the price.
I A number of utilities building new plants during the late 1970s anticipated a
tight market for low sulfur, compliance coal under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
and paid a premium for long-term compliance coal contracts. Forry, supra note 1, at 7-
9.
Id. at 7-5 to 7-10.
Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1469 (5th Cir.
1987).
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Utilities frequently relied on the force majeure clause of the
contract as one excuse.5 The case law reflects an almost universal
rejection of such claims, though, on the ground changes in
market prices are foreseeable and the risk of such change is
allocated between the parties by the pricing provisions of the
contract.6 Force majeure clauses were strictly construed and the
risk of any foreseeable contingency was assumed to have been
allocated. Courts reasoned that if parties wanted the contract
price to fluctuate with the market, they should have specifically
included a pure market price reopener provision in the contract,
rather than choosing a base price plus escalator term. 7 Alterna-
tively, if a gross disparity between the contract price and market
price was to excuse the buyer's performance, the contract should
have expressly provided for termination in this event or should
have allowed the contract price to be renegotiated when the
disparity reached a particular level. Absent specific language
clearly authorizing an escape from the contract pricing obliga-
tions, courts held the parties were bound by the contract they
made .8
I BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 645 (6th Ed. 1979) defines force majeure as a
"superior or irresistible force." Historically, force majeure events which would excuse
performance of a contractual obligation were "acts of God" or "nature." John S.
Kirkham, Force Majeure-Does It Really Work? 30 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INST. § 6-01,
at 6-2 (1984). In modern times, the term has taken on a much broader meaning to
include unforeseeable causes which are 'beyond the control and without the fault or
negligence' of the party excused." Id. at 6-3, quoting United States v. Brooks-Callaway
Co., 318 U.S. 120, 123-24 (1943). A "standard" force majeure clause often found in
coal supply contracts includes the following list of events: "acts of God, fire, acts of
civil or military authorities, acts of war, riots, insurrection, orders of court or regulatory
agencies, strikes, lockouts or other industrial disturbances, breakage of or accidents to
machinery, and any other cause ... not within the control of the party claiming
suspension of its obligations." Marvin 0. Young, Construction and Enforcement of
Long-Term Coal Supply Agreements-Coping with Conditions Arising from Foreseeable
and Unforeseeable Events-Force Majeure and Gross Inequities Clauses, 27A RocKY
MT. MIN. L. INST. 127, 139-140 (1982).
' See infra notes 61-136 and accompanying text.
As a practical matter, why would a coal operator agree to a long-term commit-
ment to supply coal of a particular quality, with the attendant long-term obligations for
labor, capital and equipment, when the operator could get the same price on the open
market without the long-term obligations? Coal suppliers must be compensated for the
long-term risks assumed and must have some assurance of recovering reasonable costs.
' See Frazier v. Collins, 187 S.W.2d 816, 817 (1945) in which the trial court
reduced rent for a gas station from $100 to $35 per month on equitable grounds because
war regulations cut sales by more than one-half. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that so long as the property was possessed and could be operated as a gas station, the
full rent must be paid.
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This decade of force majeure litigation regarding changed
market price or costs is now coming to a close as most contracts
from the 1970s have been renegotiated, bought out, or expired
by their own terms.9 During the 1990s, force majeure litigation
will likely focus on whether, or under what circumstances, the
acid rain provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
constitute a force majeure event excusing performance under a
long-term coal contract. 0 Any analysis of this issue must con-
, A significant case just decided by the Supreme Court of Kentucky is Kentucky
Util. Co. v. South E. Coal Co., 39 K.L.S. 6, 28, 1992 WL 121689 (June 4, 1992),
initiated in Fayette Circuit Court, Kentucky, 1984. The trial court held KU was entitled
to substantial price reductions but the Court of Appeals of Kentucky ruled on February
1, 1991 that market price changes did not constitute a "material, unforeseen event,"
which was necessary to trigger a price review. Accordingly, South East Coal was entitled
to the escalated price provided in the contract. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed
that portion of the Court of Appeals' decision holding that market price changes did
constitute a "material, unforeseen event."
Kentucky High Court Ruling Worries Coal, COAL OUTLOOK, June 15, 1992, at 6,
reported the reaction to the decision as follows:
Don Vish, a Lexington attorney who is the former associate solicitor for
the U.S. Dept. of Interior, last week said he was surprised by the decision
and thought it would go the other way. Although the majority opinion
attempts to limit the decision to this particular case, Vish Believes it does
have ramifications beyond the KU/SECO contract.
Not only is the "material unforeseen events" language common to many
contracts, Vish says, but courts historically have not accepted a change in
market conditions as a material unforeseen event that would justify re-
working a commercial contract. Because of its departure from the norm,
the decision [sic] be cited in other Kentucky cases, he predicts.
Although Vish does not see the decision as precedent-setting outside Ken-
tucky, he suggests that out-of-state buyers with instate suppliers may now
have a new option for litigating contract disputes. Rather than seeking to
have cases heard in their own backyard, Vish says, the buyers may find it
more advantageous to file in Kentucky-depending, of course, on the
specific language in their contracts.
Gary Conley, vice president and general counsel of Kentucky River Coal
Corp., said the landholder's concerns go beyond the fact that it leases coal
to SECO. "It does set a precedent," he stated.
"Nobody ever contemplated a market change being a material unforeseen
event," echoed a third Kentucky attorney with coal company clients.
"That's the newness of what the court has done .... Historically, we all
know the price of coal goes up and down.
In the wake of the decision, buyers will be reviewing their contracts to
determine if, through litigation or negotiation, they can reduce the price,
the attorney continued. The decision also affects the banking industry, he
said. "How do you finance the development of a coal mine to service a
long-term contract if this is the state of the law?" he asked.
1* See e.g., Georgia Power Signals Force Majeure, COAL OUTLOOK, March 18, 1991
(letters to suppliers that force majeure may be invoked to avoid existing contracts under
the Clean Air Act).
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sider the judicial construction of force majeure clauses in the
market price cases of the 1980s.
This article provides a brief overview of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments and various compliance alternatives available
to utilities. Then general principles of force majeure analysis will
be reviewed with reference to specific cases. Finally, several
exemplary force majeure clauses will be examined in light of the
courts' analysis and alternatives available to utilities to comply
with the new acid rain legislation.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments'" dramatically in-
creased the number of regulated toxic air pollutants to 189 as
compared to fewer than twenty under the 1970 law. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ["EPA"] is authorized to add or
delete chemicals subject to regulation.' 2
The "Acid Deposition Control" provisions 3 (hereinafter the
"Provisions") impose "drastic limitations on the emissions of
sulfur and nitrogen oxides from coal burning utility plants.'
' 4
Generally, the Provisions seek to achieve a ten million ton re-
duction of annual sulfur dioxide emissions from a 1980 base line
and are to cap emissions at 8.9 million tons per year by the year
2000.1 The target for reduction of nitrogen oxides is two million
tons."
Compliance with the Provisions is scheduled in two phases.
Phase I requires 110 major coal burning utility plants with more
than 100 megawatt capacity to reduce sulfur emissions to a level
no greater than 2.5 lbs/mmBtu of the baseline fuel consumption
by 1995.17 These utilities must identify their selected method of
compliance in a permit application to be filed by February 15,
1993.'1 While regulations governing the permitting mechanism
" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title I, § 108(k),
104 Stat. 2468, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7601 (1983 and supp. 1992)).
,2 Minturn T. Wright, III, Coal Supply Agreements and the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, E. MtN. L. FOUND., 8.01, 8.01 (on file at the JOURNAL OF NATURAL
REsouRCEs & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW editorial office).
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651-7651(0) (Supp. 1992).
"4 Wright, supra note 12, at 8.02.
15 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 765la(b), 7651b(a)(1).
11 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651a(b).
17 Wright, supra note 12 at 8.02; S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 302
(1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3685 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c).
19 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651g(c)(1).
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were to be promulgated by May 15, 1992,19 they were still
awaiting final OMB approval at the time of this writing. The
statutory methods for compliance include substituting control
obligations among commonly owned units, 20 installing scrub-
bers, 2 using energy conservation or renewable energy sources,
22
requesting alternative emission limits or emission averaging for
nitrogen oxide, 23 employing clean coal technology in Phase II,2
or opting into the allowance program. 25 If one of these statutory
methods for compliance is to be used, the permit application
must include a compliance plan and a description of the schedule
and means to accomplish the emission limits. 26 Any unit that
does not intend to rely on the statutory methods need only recite
that it will meet all emission limits by the deadline. 27
Each identified utility is granted a certain number of "allow-
ances" which represent the right to emit one ton of sulfur
dioxide per year.2" Allowances may be freely sold or trans-
ferred. 29 Allowances may also be reassigned among units "under
the control of such owner or operator" so that excess control
in one unit may compensate for excess emissions in another.30
In Phase II, all other existing coal-burning utility plants must
obtain emission allowances and a permit to operate.3 Generally,
allowances will be based on a sulfur dioxide emission standard
of 1.2 lbs/mmBtu . 2 Many, if not all, of the Phase I utility
plants will not be able to comply with the Phase II emission
" 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651g(c)(3).
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(b).
42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(c).
42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(f).
23 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651f(d).
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651h.
42 U.S.C.A. § 7651i.
26 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651g(b).
Z' Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 765la(3). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c, Table A for a list of the
identified utilities.
9 42 U.S.C.A. § 765lb(b). TVA was reported to have purchased allowances from
Wisconsin Power & Light for a per ton price of $250-$400. Matthew C. Wald, Company
News: Utility Reports Second Sale of its Pollution Allowances, N.Y. Taos, May 13,
1992 8D at 4; S02 Credit Markets First Step; TVA & Duquesne Buy from Wisc. P &
L, 18 COAL WEEK 20, May 19, 1992, at 1.
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(b).
31 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651d.
32 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651d(b)-(d).
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standards without installing scrubbers. Permits for Phase II com-
pliance must be obtained by 1998.11
After 1990, new utility plants beginning operations must
obtain allowances for emissions and an operating permit.34 Plants
beginning their operations after the year 2000 must obtain all
allowances needed to operate from elsewhere, and availability
of allowances is expected to be limited. 35 Phase I utilities may
achieve compliance by:
36
(1) Burning cleaner coal.
(2) Installing "scrubbers" to achieve a ninety percent reduc-
tion in emissions. These units, referred to as "extension units,"
may be granted a two-year extension of the Phase I deadline
and may receive two-for-one emission allowances as a bonus for
any over-control of sulfur dioxide emissions in excess of that
required for the extension unit 7 Bonus allowances are carried
forward into Phase II and rewards are provided for early in-
stallation of scrubbers and for reductions in the amount of high
sulfur coal used.38 Note, however, that EPA will grant only a
limited number of extension unit proposals.
(3) Substituting control obligations among units "under the
control of such owner or operator." ' 39 No definition is provided
for the term "under the control of such owner or operator."
One obvious issue is whether a parent company may substitute
allowances among all of its subsidiaries or plants, or whether
substitution is allowed only within a subsidiary.
(4) Obtaining sufficient "allowances" in the EPA reserve
allowance auction or by purchase from other utilities with excess
allowances so as to cover excess emissions. 40
(5) Opting for energy conservation and renewable energy.
41
A utility may receive additional allowances for every ton of
sulfur dioxide emissions it avoids by the use of conservation
measures or renewable energy. 42 These allowances may also be
" Wright, supra note 12, at 8.06; 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651g(f).
' Wright, supra note 12, at 8.02; 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651g(e).
" Wright, supra note 12, at 8.02-8.03; 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651b(e).
Wright, supra note 12, at 8.03-8.05.
37 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c.
8 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651d(a)(2).
42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(b).
42 U.S.C.A. § 7651b(b), 7651o(b).
41 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(0.
Q 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(f)(2)(A).
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obtained by purchasing energy from other sources using such
methods. Emission reduction must occur between January 1,
1992, and December 31, 2000.41 The utility must also have sub-
mitted a least-cost plan to the state ratemaking authority and
received approval for the use of the alternative energy source."
Allowances under these provisions are limited.
A limited number of bonus allowances are also available for
reductions achieved prior to the 1995 deadline for utility systems
which meet two criteria: (a) the utility's coal-fired generation as
a percent of total system generation decreased more than twenty
percent from 1980 through 1985, and (b) the capacity of all
coal-fired units within the utility from 1985 through 1987 was
less than fifty percent.45 Permission from the state's governor is
also required." Availability of the bonuses is limited to units
incorporating physical changes or changes in the method of
operation after November 15, 1990, including changes in the
type of fuel used. Worthy of note is § 7651 c(e)(3) which states:
In no event shall the provisions of this paragraph [apparently
referring to subsection (e) which includes three paragraphs
relating to the allocation of allowances during Phase I] be
interpreted as an event of force majeur [sic] or a commercial
impractibility [sic] or in any other way as a basis for excused
nonperformance by a utility system under a coal sales contract
in effect before November 15, 1990. 47
In other words, early compliance to receive bonus allowances is
not a force majeure event under preexisting contracts.
The fact utilities have a number of alternatives for achieving
compliance will likely pose the greatest hurdle in any attempt to
avoid performance of an existing coal supply contract. Even
high sulfur coal can continue to be burned if sufficiently blended
to reduce emissions, if allowances are purchased to compensate
for the emissions, if scrubbers are installed, or if another work-
able option is chosen.
II. LEGAL EXCUSES FOR AVOIDING CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
The legal analysis under theories of impracticability, frustra-
tion of purpose, or a general force majeure clause is basically
11 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(f)(2)(C).
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(f)(2)(D).
43 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(e)(I).
- Id.
47 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651c(e)(1).
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the same as under Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") section
2-615.4 Common law theories, however, should be kept in mind
in those situations where state law interpreting section 2-615
remains unclear or where the UCC may not apply. 49 The RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS defines impracticability as:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate
the contrary.
5 0
Impossibility of performance is not required; impracticability is
sufficient. -
Frustration of purpose is defined in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS as:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of
an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption
on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render
performance are discharged, unless the language or the circum-
stances indicate the contrary.51
While seldom relied upon, this is the logical excuse provision
for coal buyers, especially where the only obligation of the buyer
is to pay for the coal.
52
" See e.g., Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799
F.2d 265, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1986); Minturn T. Wright, III, Drafting "Excuse" Provisions
in Coal Supply Agreements, 8 E. MIN. L. INST. Ch. 9 (Cyril A. Fox, Jr. and Patrick
D. McGinley eds. 1987); Young, supra note 5, at 129; Edmund M. Carney, The Nature
and Extent of the Excuse Provided by a Force Majeure Event Under a Coal Supply
Agreement, 4 EASTERN MwN. L. INST. 11-1 at 11-4 to 11-9 (1983).
" See e.g., Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799
F.2d 265, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1986); Carl Wendt Equip. Co. v. International Harvester,
931 F.2d 1112 (6th Cir. 1991).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
92 To deal with the rare case where the buyer or (more broadly) the paying party
might have a good excuse based on some unforeseen change in circumstances, a new
rubrick was thought necessary, different from "impossibility" (the common law term)
or "impracticability" (the Code term, picked up in RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 261 (1981)), and it received the name "frustration." Rarely is it impracticable
or impossible for the payor to pay; but if something has happened to make the
performance for which he would be paying worthless to him, an excuse for not paying,
analogous to impracticability or impossibility, may be proper (citations ommited). See




The formulation for excuse by failure of presupposed con-
ditions ("commercial impracticability") under section 2-615 of
the Code is stated as follows:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation
and subject to the preceding section on substituted perform-
ance: Delay in delivery or nondelivery in whole or in part by
a seller . .. is not a breach of his duty under a contract for
sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by
the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by
compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or do-
mestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later
proves to be invalid.1
3
Comment 454 to section 2-615 states that changes in market price
or increased costs are not sufficient to excuse performance. 55
Comment 8 provides the excuse provision is not applicable "when
the contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed at the
time of contracting."'  Comment 9 notes this section may be an
excuse for buyers if a specific venture or assumption is in-
volved." Coal supply contracts are often conditioned upon the
continued operation of a specific generating plant and, thus,
would come within Comment nine applying this doctrine to
buyers. 8 Some courts have applied section 2-615 to buyers with-
out regard to whether a specific venture was involved.59
Before attempting any analysis of an excuse provision in
light of section 2-615, the cautionary advice of Professors White
and Summers should be carefully considered:
The doctrines of Impossibility, Commercial Impracticability or
as the Uniform Commercial Code knows it, Excuse by Failure
of Presupposed Conditions, comprise unclimbed peaks of con-
tract doctrine. Clearly, all of the famous early and mid-twen-
U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977).
See generally Ky. Rev. Stat. § 355.1-110 (permits consultation of the UCC's
official comments in the construction and application of that Code).
, U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (1977).
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (1977).
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 9 (1977).
38 Carney, supra note 48, at 11-19; Kentucky Util. v. South E. Coal Co., 39 K.L.S.
6, at 30, (June 4, 1992).
19 See e.g., Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Co-op, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1049,
1060 (I1. App. 1984) ("[C]omment 9 thereunder indicates that its provisions are equally
applicable to buyers so long as they comply with all the statutory requirements.").
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tieth century mountaineers, Corbin, Williston, Farnsworth and
many lesser men have made attempts on this topic but none
has succeeded in conquering the very summit. The topic inheres
in section 2-615 of the UCC, in sections 261-72 of the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS and in a series of Anglo-
American cases. In spite of attempts by all of the contract
buffs and even in the face of eloquent and persuasive general
statements, it remains impossible to predict with accuracy how
the law -will apply to a variety of relatively common cases.
Both the cases and the Code commentary are full of weasel
words such as "severe" shortage, "marked" increase, "basic"
assumptions, and "force majeure."' 0
III. How HAVE FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSES BEEN CONSTRUED?
A. Strict Construction
Generally, force majeure provisions are construed in a "strict
and conservative fashion." 61 In Vernon Lumber Corp. v. Harsen
Construction Co.,62 for example, a lumber company claimed
excuse from supplying goods under one contract because a War
Production Board order allocated part of the company's pro-
duction to a buyer with a higher priority rating. The lumber
company claimed it was not required to perform because the
first contract excused orders "subject to conditions beyond con-
trol. 1 63 The court rejected this argument as follows:
"[Clonditions beyond control" is not an ambiguous term which
will require resort to parole evidence to explain it. While its
meaning might be doubtful if this were the first time it had
been employed in a contract, it has by repeated use assumed
an indisputable connotation .... "Conditions beyond con-
trol" refers to an unforeseeable act of God or other extraor-
dinary cause which could not reasonably be dnticipated by the
parties. It would cover an unforeseeable change in the law
which made performance impossible. But it does not refer to
difficulties in performance which have developed since the
0o James J. White and Robert S. Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCUL CODE, § 3-9, at
170 (3rd ed. 1988) (footnote omitted).
" Carney, supra note 48, at 11-8.
"60 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
11 Id. at 558.
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making of the contract but which could have been antici-
pated.61
The court held the regulation existed at the time the contract
was made and reallocation of supply was a development that
could have been anticipated.
6 5
Similar strict construction of force majeure provisions arise
throughout Kentucky cases. In Tradewater Coal Co. v. Lee,6 a
coal supplier agreed to meet the buyer's requirements but failed
to make deliveries when he could sell to others at a higher price.
The supplier proved it suffered a shortage of railroad cars re-
sulting in delayed delivery and claimed this constituted a force
majeure event. The court rejected the claim, noting that Trade-
water had a sufficient number of rail cars to fill orders under
the contract.6 7 While the shortage of rail cars might have been
a valid force majeure "event," it was not the cause of nonper-
formance under the contract.6 Similarly, in Heidelberg Brewing
Co. v. E.F. Prichard Co., Inc. ,69 Heidelberg claimed government
regulations limited the amount of malt it could use in the ale it
contracted to deliver to Prichard. The court noted Heidelberg
had a sufficient amount of malt to perform the contract and the
government regulation did not prevent the performance.
7 0
In Ross Seed Co. v. Sturgis Implement & Hardware Co. ,"
Sturgis agreed to supply a fixed quantity of "1942 drop Korean"
seed to Ross. Sturgis failed to deliver when the area from which
he intended to obtain the seed was flooded and the available
seed was required for a prior contract. The force majeure clause
provided: "The seller assumes no liability whatsoever for delay
or failure to ship or to deliver goods caused by fire, flood,
strike, or other causes beyond our control. ' 72 The court rejected
the force majeure claim stating there was nothing in the contract
which limited the source of the seed. While Sturgis would have
lost money by buying the seed from elsewhere and performing
- Id. (emphasis added).
I d.
"6 68 S.W. 400 (1902).
id. at 401-02.
Id. at 402.
180 S.W.2d 849 (1944).
70 Id. at 852-53.
7t 181 S.W.2d 426 (1944).
1 Id. at 427.
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under the contract, the court held this was the risk Sturgis
assumed .7'
B. Application of General Law on Excuse of Performance
Although courts allow parties to broaden the common law
or UCC excuse doctrines by agreement, an event of force ma-
jeure must be listed with particularity before it will be enforced
outside those doctrines. 74 In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald
Douglas Corp.,7 for example, the court considered Comment
eight to section 2-615 which allows express agreements to "en-
large upon or supplant" that section of the Code. If the excusing
event were specifically listed in the force majeure clause, the
court concluded, the risk of its occurrence was allocated by the
parties and performance would be excused if all other require-
ments for excuse were met.76 If a party is relying merely upon
general language in a force majeure clause, however, the doctrine
of commercial impracticability will apply.
As we understand Comment 8, where there is doubt concerning
the parties' intention, exemption clauses should not be con-
strued as broadening the excuses available under the Code's
impracticability rule .... Exculpatory provisions which are
phrased merely in general terms have long been construed as
excusing only unforeseen events which make performance im-
practicable. Courts have often held, therefore, that if a prom-
isor desires to broaden the protections available under the
excuse doctrine he should provide for the excusing contingen-
cies with particularity and not in general language. 7
Thus, if general language of the force majeure clause is being
relied upon and the standard for excuse is commercial imprac-
11 Id. at 429. See also American Bridge Co. v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 107 S.W.
279 (1908) (holding that inability to get production materials was not beyond company's
"reasonable control" within the contract); Wickliffe Farms, Inc. v. Owensboro Grain
Co., 684 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that inability to deliver corn under
contract due to drought is not excuse for nondelivery when the contract did not specify
where corn was to be grown).
- Cf. Kentucky Util. v. South E. Coal Co., 39 K.L.S. 6, at 30 (June 4, 1992)
1992 WL 121689 (Although interpreting a price reopener provision rather than a force
majeure clause, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected, without discussion, an argu-
ment that such specificity is required to excuse performance under the pricing provisions
of the contract and the UCC.).
75 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
71 Id. at 990-996.
, Id. at 990-991 (citations omitted).
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ticability, courts assume the parties have allocated the risk of all
foreseeable events in the contract. If the risk has not been
expressly allocated in some other provision of the contract,
however, it is assumed the risk of loss is on the promissor.78
Every risk has a price, and the parties should have bargained
through the price term for the assumption of any risk. 79 Com-
ment eight to section 2-615 explains:
Thus the exemptions of this section do not apply when the
contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time
of contracting to be included among the business risks which
are fairly to be regarded as part of the dickered terms, either
consciously or as a matter of reasonable, commercial interpre-
tation from the circumstances. 8
Foreseeability has been an important factor in force majeure
decisions. Courts suggest that even events such as the Arab oil
embargo, 8 the OPEC cartel," an oversupply of gas and changing
and shifting markets83 were all foreseeable. Rather than analyz-
ing whether an "event" was foreseeable, a better analysis would
focus on whether the "effect" of changes in market price or
contract costs arising from any change in the economy was
foreseeable and the risk had been allocated in the contract price
or other terms .
4
C. Legislation
According to one commentator, legislation might be in a
special category from other events.8" The language of section 2-
615 provides there is no breach if performance is made "im-
practicable ...by compliance in good faith with any . . . gov-
' Kirkham, supra note 5. at 6-28.
" Edmund M. Carney, Risk Allocation in the Long-Term Coal Sales Agreement,
EAsTEiN MtN. L. INsT. 9-1 at 9-8 to 9-11 (1980).
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (1977).
"Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D.
Iowa 1978); Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Coop, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1049, 1059
(1ll. Ct. App. 1984); Missouri Pub. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 727
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
': Iowa Electric Light & Power, 467 F. Supp. at 154.
'3 Northern Illinois Gas Co., 461 N.E.2d at 1059.
See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (1977) ("Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market
in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business
contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.").
' Carney, supra note 48, at 11-11.
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ernmental regulation.'"' Cases involving legislation or government
regulation, however, do not differ in their analysis. 7 In Inter-
national Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc.,"8 a state
regulation required reduction in emissions with the result that
International Minerals and Chemical ("IMC") had to change its
manufacturing process and its need for natural gas was dramat-
ically reduced.8 9 The court held IMC could not avoid its obli-
gations under a "take or pay" gas supply contract because there
was "no obstacle to IMC's ability to pay." 9 A clause allowing
adjustment of the minimum contract quantity was triggered,
however, because, for reasons beyond IMC's reasonable control,
it was unable to receive its minimum purchase obligation of
gas.
91
A second case applied a similar analysis. In Sabine Corp. v.
ONG Western, Inc. ,9 the court held government regulation merely
permitted rather than required ONG to reduce its purchases
under a "take or pay" gas supply contract. 93 Performance was
not excused under section 2-615 because "governmental regula-
tion is foreseeable as a matter of law."4 The court noted refer-
ences to governmental regulation in the contract itself
demonstrated that regulation was actually foreseen by the par-
ties.95
The same analysis was applied to reach an opposite result in
Far West Federal Bank v. Director, O.T.S.,9 where a new
governmental statute was held to be sufficient to excuse per-
formance under a conversion agreement in which a group of
investors agreed to purchase a thrift.9 7 An integral part of the
conversion agreement was that the government would forbear
enforcement of a number of regulations to allow the thrift to
become profitable. 98 After the well publicized "S & L crisis"
U.C.C. § 2-615(a).
, Carney, supra note 48, at 11-12.
68 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 883.
' Id. at 885.
91 Id. at 887.
725 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Okla. 1989).
9 Id. at 1170.
i Id. at 1177.
95 Id.





Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)." The Office of Thrift Super-
vision (OTS) then notified the investors that they were not in
compliance with the capital requirements under FIRREA. 100
The OTS argued that, in order for the investors to be excused
from the conversion agreement on frustration grounds, they
must show FIRREA was not foreseeable.' 0' The court held "even
if it was entirely foreseeable that Congress would enact FIRREA
(or some other law affecting the banking industry), FIRREA's
impact on the Conversion Agreement was not foreseeable,"12 in
that it abrogated a basic assumption of that agreement and made
performance impossible.103
D. Preventing Performance
Even if an event qualifies as a force majeure event, perform-
ance is not excused unless all other requirements of the force
majeure clause or section 2-615 have been met. Typical force
majeure clauses require that the event render a party "unable to
carry out any of its obligations under this agreement either in
whole or in part,"'- or "which wholly or partly prevent ...
the utilizing ... of the coal."' 15 In Northern Indiana Public
Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co.,'06 the Indiana Public
Service Commission ordered NIPSCO to attempt to buy electri-
cal power from neighboring utilities and produce less of its own
power which had become more expensive to produce internally
due to a long term coal supply contract. 0 7 The court refused to
excuse NIPSCO's obligation to buy coal under the force majeure
clause as follows:
Such an order does not "prevent," whether wholly or in
part, NIPSCO from using the coal; it just prevents NIPSCO
from shifting the burden of its improvidence or bad luck in
Id. at 956; 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811-33e (1989).
"' Far West Federal Bank, 787 F. Supp at 956.
I01 Id. at 961.
I ld.
103 Id. at 960-61.
," Carney, supra note 48, at 11-7.
05 Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265,
274 (7th Cir. 1986).
I06 Id.
0 Id. at 267.
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having incorrectly forecasted its fuel needs to the backs of the
hapless ratepayers.
The normal risk of a fixed-price contract is that the market
price will change. If it rises, the buyer gains at the expense of
the seller (except insofar as escalator provisions give the seller
some protection); if it falls, as here, the seller gains at the
expense of the buyer. The whole purpose of a fixed-price
contract is to allocate risk in this way. A force majeure clause
interpreted to excuse the buyer from the consequences of the
risk he expressly assumed would nullify a central term of the
contract.os
While NIPSCO was not required to continue to take the coal,
a jury verdict of $181,000,000 for breach of the contract was
upheld. "09
In Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Co-op, Inc.,""° the
gas company invoked force majeure because of an order denying
a rate increase due to an excessive inventory of gas in storage.
The force majeure clause excused performance based on "com-
pliance with law, regulation, requisition, request or direction
made by any governmental authority.""' The court held "Itihe
rate order did not compel, suggest, or even recommend that NI-
Gas act in any specific manner.""' Rather, to constitute a force
majeure event "[w]hat is required is that the order clearly direct
or prohibit an act which proximately causes non-performance or
breach of a contract."" 3
E. Impracticability
Under general "inability to perform" language in a force
majeure clause, the question becomes whether performance has
been rendered "impracticable." The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS describes impracticability as making "performance
so vitally different from what was reasonably to be expected as
to alter the essential nature of that performance."1 4 Another
101 Id. at 275.
Id. at 280-81.
110 461 N.E.2d 1049 (Il. Ct.. App. 1984).
Id. at 1057.
12 Id. at 1058.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, Introductory note, 309 (1981).
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example of impracticability might be "an abrupt ten-fold in-
crease in cost to the seller" where the event causing the increase
was an unforeseeable disaster." 5 In Louisiana Power & Light v.
Allegheny Ludlum Industries,1 6 the court held any loss must be
"especially severe and unreasonable" and cost increases of thirty-
eight percent over the original contract price were insufficient."
7
The court also noted that "cost increases of 50 - 58 percent had
generally not been considered of sufficient magnitude to excuse
performance.""18 In Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Co-op,
Inc.,"' the court held a "party seeking to excuse his performance
must show that he can operate only at a loss and that the loss
would be so severe and unreasonable that failure to excuse
performance would result in grave injustice."0
The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently rejected such com-
mercial impractibility doctrines in upholding a price reopener
interpretation in Kentucky Utilities v. South East Coal Co..
2
1
In Kentucky Utilities the parties entered into a twelve and one
half year coal supply contract with a provision for a price
adjustment for "material unforeseen events."1 When the price
of coal decreased, KU filed suit seeking a price reduction claim-
ing unforeseen economic events, such as the demise of the Arab
Oil embargo and decreased demand for electricity, caused a
change in market prices which warranted a change in the contract
price.' The trial court found as a matter of fact that such
events constituted "material unforeseen events" and appeals
ensued. Rather than following the reasoning in Northern Indiana
Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co.,124 the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held the factual determination by the trial
court was not clearly erroneous and commercial impracticability
had no application because the parties had drafted away from
the UCC.1'1 The court did not discuss or distinguish the long
I' ld. at 311.
6 517 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. La. 1981).
'' Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1326, citing Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp.
129 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
461 N.E.2d 1049 (Ill. App. 1984).
Id. at 1061.
" 1992 WL 121689 (Ky. June 4, 1992).
Id. at *2.
" Id. at *3.
'" See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
' 1992 WL 121689 at *5-6.
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line of authority that holds interpretation of a contract is, at
least, a mixed question of law and fact and is not subject to the
"clearly erroneous" standard.126 No claim was made in this case
that the contract was ambiguous or was induced by fraud or
mutual mistake.
27
Justice Lambert, joined by Justice Reynolds in a fervent
dissent, warned: "[T]he decision of the majority should chill the
hearts of businesspersons throughout Kentucky for it stands for
the proposition that detailed contracts may be rewritten by judges
on a 'judgment call' to accommodate their views of equity."'
' 28
According to Justice Lambert, the situation in NIPSCO was
"factually similar to the case at bar and legally indistinguisha-
ble."' 2 9 Justice Lambert further concluded "[i]n the final anal-
ysis, this case boils down to KU's seizure of an opportunity to
make a greater profit by breach of its contract, and at the
expense of its fuel supplier.''130
F. Other Considerations
Even if a force majeure event surfaces and performance is
rendered impracticable, other considerations may prevent excuse
from performance. Parties will not be excused if the event on
which they rely is caused by their own action or negligence.' 3'
In Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp. ,132 for instance,
McLouth claimed explosions in its thirty-ton compressor excused
performance permanently. The court held:,
Apart from the fact that there was not an adequate showing
that the explosions were beyond McLouth's control, the de-
fense of force majeure is subject to equitable principles and
thus would not serve to perpetually release McLouth from its
' See e.g., Lancaster Glass Corp v. Philips Ecg, Inc., 835 F.2d 652, 658 (6th Cir.
1987); Ram Construction Co., Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1053
(3d Cir. 1984); Kentucky Util. v. Carter, 176 S.W.2d 81, 83 (1943); Johnson v. Edwards,
20 S.W.2d 76 (1926); Neel v. Wagner-Shuck Realty, 576 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Ky.Ct. App.
1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212, Cmt. d (1981).
12, Based upon mutual mistake and frustration of purpose, the court in Aluminum
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp 53 (W.D.Pa. 1980) modified the
price term of a contract to avoid injustice.
1992 WL 121689 at *14 (Dissenting opinion).
I2, Id. at *15.
' Id.
'L Carney, supra note 48, at 11-29 to 11-31.
381 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. 111. 1974).
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contractual obligations .... On the contrary, McLouth would
be required to employ alternative means to fulfill its obliga-
tions, such as by replacing the thirty-ton compressor with safe,
productive equipment.'
33
Force majeure clauses generally require a party to "overcome
the effects of such force majeure events with all reasonable
dispatch.' 34 The implied duty of good faith in UCC section 1-
203 31 will also be imposed.
36
IV. FORCE MAELURE ANALYSIS APPLIED TO AcID RAIN
LEGISLATION
In any analysis, the foremost consideration must be the
specific language of the force majeure clause. A clause that
specifically mentions legislation, regulations or orders "relating
to air pollution, the effect of which will make it impossible or
impractical for Buyer to utilize the coal subject hereto without
substantially changing or altering its utilization equipment'
'3 7
would provide a good argument under many scenarios that the
1990 legislation is a force majeure event. Alternatively, the seller
could argue that no change or alteration of equipment is nec-
essary because the buyer can simply purchase sufficient allow-
ances to compensate for the excess emissions. Another option
for the buyer would be blending the current coal with adequate
low-sulfur coal to meet emission requirements. A dispute could
also arise over what is a "substantial" change or alteration of
the utilization equipment. It is unclear what standard should be
'13 Id. at 256 (footnote omitted). See also Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (performance was not excused as there was
nonshowing that mine could not have produced enough potash); Iowa Electric Light &
Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979) (no showing that increases were reasonably unforeseen
and not a function of Atlas' own action).
"' Carney, supra note 48, at 11-33.
13, U.C.C. § 1-203 (1991). "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
Im Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1267-1269
(10th Cir. 1988); see also Kentucky Util. Co. v. South E. Coal Co., 1992 WL 121689
at *10 ("[h]owever, we conclude that KU was obligated under KRS 355.1-203 to use
good faith in invoking force majeure"); Kirkham, supra note 5, at 6-19.
"I Richard McMillan, Jr. and William L. Anderson, Remarks Regarding Force
Majeure and Other Excuse Clauses, presented at the 1990 NCA Coal Lawyers Confer-
ence, Oct. 11-14, 1990, at 9, Ex. 2 (on file at Journal of Natural Resources & Environ-
mental Law editorial office).
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used in determining whether it is "impractical" for the buyer to
utilize the coal. Courts might require the "ten-fold" increase
suggested in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. 3 8
A buyer's opportunity to invoke the force majeure clause
would be improved if he was not required to incur any "unrea-
sonable expense" and if that term was defined as follows:
No expense contemplated by this section shall be deemed rea-
sonable if it would result in a total cost to buyer, in using
seller's coal, in excess of the total cost of using competitive
fuels which are then reasonably available to buyer and which
can be utilized in conformity with all such restrictions. 3 9
This language is likely to engender a heated discussion on the
definition of "competitive fuels."
A more typical force majeure clause would read as follows:
"In the event any restrictions are imposed by governmental
agencies which restrict or prevent the burning of some or all of
the coal to be supplied under this Agreement . . . . 140 The
question is whether the buyer is in any way restricted from
burning coal by the new legislation. A court could conclude this
legislation is no different from the economic purchase orders in
NIPSCO where the court held such an order "does not 'prevent,'
whether wholly or in part, NIPSCO from using the coal .... ,41
Even if a buyer is permitted to avoid unreasonable expense,
"unreasonable expense" often remains undefined. How should
the cost of scrubbing be measured? If scrubbing results in bonus
allowances for the utility, should the increased costs be offset
by the value of the bonus allowances? Is scrubbing inevitable
for the plant by the year 2000 and the only additional cost is
that associated with making the capital investment a few years
earlier? Assuming a Phase I utility with current fuel-related
capital and operating costs of $40,000,000 annually with the cost
increasing to $60,000,000 annually with scrubbers, a court could
hold, drawing on Iowa Electric Light & Power v. Atlas Corp.,
that a fifty percent cost increase does not warrant excuse from
the contract.1 4 A seller could also argue that some minimum
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 11, 311 (1981).
"9 Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 799 F.2d at 275.
,, Young, supra note 5, at 158.
Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 799 F.2d at 275.




level of increased cost is inevitable under any compliance plan
and that only the additional amount associated with using the
contract coal should be taken into consideration.
If the force majeure clause is full of "weasel words" like
the following, the intensity of the debate will increase dramati-
cally:
Purchaser and seller recognize that environmental restrictions
(including air quality considerations) may substantially hinder
the purchasing or burning of coal hereunder by purchaser at
one or more of its plants. If any such restriction substantially
hinders or makes economically infeasible the burning of coal
by the plant or plants of purchaser .... (emphasis added).1
43
Once again, a court may suggest that purchasing or burning of
the coal is not hindered in any way; it is only more expensive
to do so. Economically infeasible could be construed to mean
nothing more than commercially impracticable.
Assuming a buyer's force majeure clause protection is inad-
equate to excuse performance, a number of other issues arise
under UCC section 2-615.1'4 For example, were the circumstances
at the time of contracting such that it can fairly be said the
absence of the specific protection against this legislation is evi-
dence of an allocation of the risk to the buyer? Sulfur dioxide
has been a regulated pollutant since 1970.'14 The Senate Envi-
ronment and Public Works Committee reported bills on acid
rain control in 1982, 1984 and 1987.1' The New Source Per-
formance Standards effective in 1974 required facilities built
thereafter to meet sulfur dioxide emission limits of 1.2 lbs/
mmBtu, equivalent to the Phase II limits of the Act.' 47 According
to one author, "[that the government would take action to
reduce sulfur dioxide emissions is, and has been for at least a
decade, as foreseeable as World War II was in 1941."'1
Alternatives for achieving compliance increase geometrically
where a utility owns or controls multiple plants. The installation
of scrubbers at two out of four plants may offset the emissions
'4 One of many similar contracts observed by the authors.
-- U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977).
141 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (1970).
" 135 CONG. Rac. S9,650-76, at S9,666 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
147 40 C.F.R. § 60.43(a)(2) (1974).
" Robert J. Nordstrom, Coal Supply Contracts and Proposed Clean Air Act
Amendments, 11 E. MIN. L. INST. 12-1, 12-28 (1990).
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associated with burning high sulfur coal in all four plants.
Switching to low sulfur coal at one or more plants or blending
could achieve compliance in itself or be combined with other
emission reducing options. No matter what option a utility
chooses with multiple plants, a seller is likely to argue the event
of force majeure on which the utility relies was brought about
by its own action and management decisions rather than by the
legislation itself.
The multiple plant utility must also consider whether the
section 2-615 excuse will even be available to it as a buyer, since
there is no longer a single plant which would more closely
resemble the "specific venture" language in Comment 9.149 If
for any reason the buyer is limited to the doctrine of frustration
of purpose, a court could well conclude the principal purpose
of the buyer in a long-term coal contract would be to obtain a
dependable supply of coal and that purpose has not been frus-
trated. As many courts have held, "very seldom is a party
successful in obtaining relief based on frustration of purpose." 3 0
V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
If decisions from the 1980s provide any guidance, utilities
will not fare well in court if a general force majeure clause is
invoked in response to acid rain legislation. Absent very partic-
ularized language allocating the risk of environmental legislation
on the supplier, courts are most likely to hold such legislation
was foreseeable, it does not prevent the use of the coal or
frustrate the purpose of the contract, and the increased cost of
performing the contract obligations is not sufficient to excuse
any obligations of performance. The warning by White and
Summers bears repeating, however: "[Elven in the face of elo-
quent and persuasive general statements, it remains impossible
to predict with accuracy how the law will apply to a variety of
relatively common cases."'
Courts may well view efforts to protect the environment
from a much different perspective than that suggested by liti-
1 U.C.C. § 2-615, cmt. 9 (1977). Alternatively, the court may not be able to rely
on the official commentary, as was the case in Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 277 (7th Cir. 1986).
" Nordstrom, supra note 148, at 12-23.




gation relating to market prices. Some indication of that per-
spective can be found in International Minerals Corp. v. Llano,'
5 2
where the court rejected complaints that IMC reduced its pur-
chases in 1981 but compliance with the emission standards was
not due until 1984. The court held:
We must reject this contention on two grounds: First, as a
matter of policy, individuals and corporations who cooperate
with local regulatory agencies and comply with the letter and
spirit of legally proper regulations, environmental or otherwise,
are to be encouraged. Stalling tactics are not regarded favor-
ably. Second, as a matter of law, government policy need not
be explicitly mandatory to cause impracticability.'
The clearest implication of the current decisions, however, is
that careful drafting of long-term contracts will become more
critical than ever. General guidelines for drafting are discussed
in several articles, 5 4 but when hundreds of millions of dollars
can hinge on a few words, extreme caution is required.
Other provisions of the contract also deserve careful thought.
Quality specifications and control over testing methodology will
become even more important. The increased number of regulated
pollutants may lead to greater detail in specification of the coal's
chemical and physical characteristics. Given the natural incon-
sistency of coal, a seller's risk of suspension or termination will
increase as specifications become more detailed. Buyers may also
insist upon greater control over sampling and analysis and, for
the protection of both parties, the sampling method should be
specifically described.'
Buyers may demand a "requirements" contract and sellers
should seek protection by negotiating a minimum quantity or a
long time table for deciding requirements. An estimate of the
requirements included in the contract under UCC section 2-
306(1)156 may prevent any substantial reduction.' Other nego-
* 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985).
I d. at 887.
" Young, supra note 5; Wright, supra note 48; Wright, supra note 12.
"' Wright, supra note 12, at 8.06-8.07.
U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1991) provides:
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements which
may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably dispropor-
tionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any
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tiating points might include the right to supply another unit if
the destination unit is converted or shut down.
Sellers who are forced to accept tight quality specifications
will want to limit a buyer's remedies in order to preclude con-
sequential damages, provide for a time to cure, and provide for
specific dollar penalties where possible. Unless the contract ex-
pressly provides the stated remedies are exclusive, UCC section
2-719(l)(b)Y' permits other remedies. In Northern Illinois Gas
Co. v. Energy Co-op, Inc., 9 for example, the court held UCC
section 2-718 permits a liquidated damages clause to override
other remedies even though the contract remedies are not stated
to be exclusive.Iw In that case, a jury verdict of $305,500,000 in
favor of the seller was reduced by a liquidated damages clause
to $13,500,000 on appeal. 16t Sellers may want to require the
buyer to pay a fraction of the seller's investment in the contract
if it is terminated or requirements are reduced below a certain
minimum within a specified period of time. The disparities be-
tween the usual remedies of a buyer and seller were characterized
by one commentator as follows:
We need to bear in mind that the customer [buyer] often has
the heavy stick of injunctive relief if the producer [seller] does
not ship as required, whereas the producer may be able to do
little more than wring his hands if the full invoice is not paid,
or sue and wait until his grandchildren are on Social Security
and he has given his fortune to lawyers before collecting.
62
As if this result were not harsh enough, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky recently approved a procedure where the buyer was
normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be
tendered or demanded.
117 Cyril Bath Co. v. Winters Industries, 892 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1989) (court awarded
lost profits to seller for the minimum amount that the contract had specified to be
delivered annually); City of Louisville v. Rockwell Mnfg. Co., 482 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1973) (Rockwell awarded damages for unsold and unsalable parking meters manufactured
based on a minumum requirements quote in contract).
U.C.C. § 2-719(1)() (1991) provides:
Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of
the preceding question and on liquidation and limitations of damages,
resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
'" 461 N.E.2d 1049 (111. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 1056.
I' Id. at 1054.
" Carney, supra note 79, at 9-14.
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permitted to deposit contract payments into court for nearly five
years and avoid even a breach of contract claim while the seller
was forced to continue shipping coal until bankrupt. 63 The
importance of protecting a seller from such a result through
specific contract language cannot be overstated.
CONCLUSION
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and their acid rain
provisions will likely spawn extensive litigation on force majeure
and other clauses in long-term supply contracts. Utilities faced
with a hostile regulatory environment have an incentive to seek
a court order rather than negotiate a compromise if existing coal
supply contracts are inconsistent with emission reductions. Liti-
gation or arbitration over the meaning of weasel words will be
expensive for buyers, sellers and consumers alike. If the contract
has been carefully drafted with enough specificity to shift the
risk of environmental legislation to the seller, a declaration of
force majeure by a utility based upon the acid rain legislation
should be upheld. In all other situations, it is dangerous to
predict any outcome, but the likelihood of excuse from perform-
ance of the contract obligations appears slim.
63 Kentucky Util. Co. v. South E. Coal Co., slip op. at 20-23 (Ky. June 4, 1992).
See supra note 9.
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